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Abstract This article presents early results from an
opinion formation study based on a 76-member panel
of U.S. citizens, with comparison data from a group
of 177 nanotechnology experts. While initially sim-
ilar to the expert group in terms of their perceptions
of the risks, beneﬁts, and need for regulation
characterizing several forms of nanotechnology, the
ﬁrst follow-up survey indicates that the panel is
beginning to diverge from the experts, particularly
with respect to perceptions of the levels of various
‘‘societal’’ risks that nanotechnology might present.
The data suggest that responding to public concerns
may involve more than attention to physical risks in
areas such as health and environment; concerns about
other forms of risk actually appear more salient.
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This article reports on the ﬁrst two waves of survey
data collected from a small panel study of U.S.
citizens in South Carolina, with baseline comparison
data from a national group of published nanotech-
nology experts. This comparison is speciﬁcally
designed to capture the dynamics of early phase
opinion formation in the initial period after enrolling
in the study; the results reveal modest, but noticeable
elevations in perceived risk. Subsequent analysis will
consider longer-term trends. While initially quite
close to the experts in terms of their perceptions of
most risks and beneﬁts, the 76-member citizens’
panel began, and remains, more concerned about a
variety of what we term ‘‘societal risks’’ such as
economic, distributional, and privacy issues than
about health or environmental risks. Citizens’ panel
members are also more in favor of regulation than
nanotechnology experts, despite foreseeing roughly
equivalent beneﬁts. In our ﬁrst follow-up survey of
the panel, as reported here, we note a small, but quite
visible increase in panel members’ perceptions of
health risks and rising concern about a range of
societal risks, particularly privacy, which panelists
appear to perceive nanotechnology as likely to erode.
Scientists continue to express enthusiasm about
the promise of nanotechnology, while also revealing
increasing concern over how to evaluate its potential
toxicity (Service 2008; Shatkin 2008). Recently,
journals in this area appear to have been devoting
much more space to assessing nanotoxicity; the third
of three special issues on this topic in the Journal of
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issue, reﬂecting the increased recognition and atten-
tion given to potential health and environmental risks.
It is now widely acknowledged that nanotechnology
exposure, especially among workers but also for the
eventual consumers of nano-related products, carries
physical risks, and that these are poorly understood,
with the regulatory community scrambling to get on
top of this situation at the federal, state, and
sometimes local level. However, within the scientiﬁc
community, ‘‘upstream’’ scientists developing nano-
technology may still have different views on issues of
potential risk than ‘‘downstream’’ scientists trained to
evaluate health and environmental impacts (Powell
2007).
Previous research has already indicated that non-
expert citizens appear to be at least as concerned
about the societal risks of nanotechnology as they are
about threats to health and the environment (Priest
and Fussell 2006; Cobb and Macoubrie 2004). Our
data suggests that this gap between perceived health
and environmental risks and perceived societal risks
is increasing. We argue, therefore, that if the
scientiﬁc and engineering communities want to be
responsive to public concerns, addressing health and
environmental impacts is certainly necessary, but not
sufﬁcient. In otherwise democratic societies, policy
that ignores the full range of public concerns or
avoids responding to public input risks the potential
public rejection of an entire class of technology, as
evidenced by the current state of nuclear power in the
U.S. and genetically modiﬁed organisms worldwide.
Not only does early public involvement connect the
citizenry to policy-making, but it also illuminates
problems that might have been overlooked by policy
makers and allows citizen ‘‘expertise’’ to inform the
decision process.
Public awareness and concern about nanotechnol-
ogy and its potential risks remains low. According to
a national study released by Hart Research in 2008,
75% of those polled said they had heard little or
nothing at all about nanotechnology, and 65% of
those who had heard nothing have no opinion about
it. Of those who have heard about nanotechnology,
only 8% believe the risks outweigh the beneﬁts.
Results from the South Carolina citizens’ panel (see
‘‘Methods’’ below) are not intended to be generaliz-
able to the U.S. population in terms of speciﬁc
opinions; indeed, both African–Americans and
conservative Christians—groups the same Hart
Research study identiﬁed as likely less optimistic
about nanotech’s beneﬁts than the American aver-
age—were deliberately included among our panelists,
along with other ordinary citizens, Columbia com-
munity leaders, and members of an environmental
group. Nevertheless, our panel members are very
much like the general American population in being
largely uninformed and mostly positive about
nanotechnology.
Based on initial face-to-face interviews conducted
prior to administering the initial set of quantitative
survey instruments, it seems to us that reactions to
nanotechnology follow a ‘‘template’’ generated from
exposure to previous technologies, in the absence of
speciﬁc information or clear pre-existing mental
images of what nanotechnology might be. Americans
are largely positive about technology, and they
continue to trust scientists (NSF 2008, p. 737). Yet,
they also expect technology to carry risks as well as
beneﬁts (Priest and Kramer 2008). Their reactions
likely derive from these generalized expectations as
much as speciﬁc reactions to nanotechnology (which
was deﬁned for them prior to actual survey admin-
istration). They may also reﬂect generalized concerns
about privacy, the economy, regulatory adequacy,
and so on, as well as patterns of trust or distrust.
How the public comes to view a new technology is
not created along the lines that traditional risk or cost-
beneﬁt analysis might predict. The lay public forms
its opinions from a variety of innate and external
information, biases, and associations. The Social
Ampliﬁcation of Risk Framework (Kasperson et al.
1988) details some of the ways various social
institutions can amplify, maintain, or attenuate the
public’s perception of a risk. Unlike what is assumed
by the models used by the trained risk analyst
calculating the probability of an adverse event, risk
information rarely travels directly from the sender
(expert) to the receiver (public). Instead, the infor-
mation travels through many intermediaries, each of
which ﬁlters, processes, and then passes along the
message. As these intermediaries, which include
expert sources, journalists, interpersonal contacts,
and a host of other actors, are all inﬂuenced in
complex ways by a variety of social or cultural
factors, the ampliﬁcation of risk framework attempts
to integrate theories from a number of social and
behavioral science ﬁelds.
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into how the panel group evaluates nanotechnology.
While our initial introduction of the topic to these
individuals may increase their awareness (acting as a
priming effect), agenda-setting theory (McCombs and
Shaw 1993) predicts that extended mass media
coverage of an issue (in this case, nanotechnology
or some perceived personal impact of this technol-
ogy) will increase salience and capture people’s
continued attention. How this affects perception can
also be inﬂuenced by how the media stories are
framed. Framing attempts to set the limits for how a
topic is discussed by selecting and omitting certain
elements, information, phrases, and words (Entman
1993). While sometimes done strategically in a
conscious attempt to inﬂuence public reception,
framing is also an inevitable consequence of the
way news work is done, and stories are created
(Tuchman 1978). Knowledge gap theory (Tichenor
et al. 1980) predicts that some demographic groups
will have access to different levels of information
about an emerging controversy than others, and
further that local media may be less likely to cover
conﬂict than regional or national media. Taken
together, these three ideas from communication
theory predict that groups differentiated by their
media use may have quite different exposure to
information about emerging issues.
Mass media coverage of nanotechnology risks is
still nascent. While coverage, in general, has
increased dramatically in recent years (Gorss and
Lewenstein 2005; Stephens 2004), the reports con-
tinue to be largely positive, with little attention paid
to potential risks. In a dedicated survey on nano risks
in national media sources, researchers found that only
121 of almost 400 nanotechnology news stories were
about social or physical risks, and even among those
121, only 33% of the paragraphs presented negative
aspects, the remainder being either neutral or even
positive about the technology (Friedman and Egolf
2005). ‘‘Booster’’ coverage of beneﬁts seems to
characterize early coverage of many emerging tech-
nologies. Only about 7% of approximately 3,600 U.S.
and U.K. news reports on nanotechnology from 2000
to 2006 mention risks at all; of the 163 U.S. news
reports mentioning any risks, 111 mentioned envi-
ronmental risks, 122 mentioned health risks, and 107
mentioned a variety of ‘‘societal risks’’ (Friedman
and Egolf 2008).
The Social Ampliﬁcation of Risk Framework also
contends that psychological, social, and cultural
aspects need to be considered in policy-making.
Traditional risk analysis has tended to neglect not
only these inﬂuences but also their potential to create
perceptual ‘‘ripples’’ in a society. These ripples are
created when proposed changes resonate in some
fashion with the public. This resonance could be
innate, springing from the person’s psychological
schema, their demographic background, or their
particular cultural worldview (Slovic et al. 2004).
Or it could be externally derived through a third
person effect (Paul et al. 2000) whereby individuals
feel that the changes caused by the new technology
will affect others more greatly than themselves,
motivating those individuals to act to protect their
broader community. As one group reacts to these
perceived changes, it may create a ripple effect that
moves to another group that then reacts in a similar
fashion (Kasperson and Kasperson 2005). While
these ripples sometimes appear to present a signiﬁ-
cant obstacle for policy makers, they, in fact, serve as
a protective mechanism for societies. Once triggered,
the ripples expose the fuller scope of the impacts
caused by a new technology and again highlight the
need for public input into the decision-making
process.
However, to date, nanotechnology appears to be an
attenuated risk rather than an ampliﬁed one. Despite
considerable expert opinion suggesting that nano-
technology may have substantial health and environ-
mental implications, the general public continues to
be largely neutral or even optimistic about it (See,
e.g., Scheufele et al. 2009; Hart Research Associates,
Inc 2008; Cobb and Macoubrie 2004). While public
concern about nanotechnology’s risks has recently
begun to rise among our panel members, the increase
has been relatively modest, and has varied for
different media consumption groups.
Methods
The target area for this study included metropolitan
Columbia, South Carolina, the state capital, and other
rural and urban areas in the northwest quadrant of the
state. The University of South Carolina, Columbia,
has a nanotechnology center, and has initiated a
variety of associated public awareness activities
J Nanopart Res (2010) 12:11–20 13
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broader community; thus, some of our panel mem-
bers (though by no means all of them) would have
had opportunities to hear something about nanotech-
nology research or read about it in their local
newspapers. (Initially, we expected that over time,
this might inﬂuence popular awareness in the region,
although there is no direct evidence of this to date.)
Rather than rely on a random sample, we recruited
panelists from a variety of different local groups to
incorporate participants of different backgrounds. As
community leaders, we included members of the
Kiwanis Club and the Chamber of Commerce in
Columbia; as panelists with speciﬁc religious afﬁli-
ations, we recruited members of an African–Amer-
ican church and a mainstream Baptist church where
our student interviewers had contacts; as members of
the environmentalist population, we chose regional
Sierra Club chapter members; and as non-afﬁliated
ordinary citizens, we chose members of the staff of a
day care facility and a group of American Cancer
Society volunteers. Use of these groups helped ensure
that the study participants represented a broad range
of views; however, the sample size was not sufﬁcient
to justify analysis of each group by itself.
Gaining truly random samples with acceptable
response rates for any survey effort is becoming
increasingly difﬁcult; gaining a truly random sample
for an intensive panel study effort involving face-to-
face interviews and multiple surveys over time is
literally impossible. Instead, we focused on the goal
of including as broad as possible a range of
participants recruited through a variety of commu-
nity-based organizations in our target area. Although
they did not ofﬁcially represent the views of these
organizations, the diverse afﬁliations secured through
this recruitment strategy help insure a variety of
perspectives. Our goal throughout has been to
supplement other national survey efforts by studying
a smaller group of people more intensely over time,
to observe where they get information and how they
form opinions. The results are not based on a random
sample, and therefore speciﬁc numerical results are
not generalizable; however, we intend that our ﬁnal
conclusions about patterns of information use and
opinion development will have broader applicability.
As incentives, participants were offered a $25
initial payment in the form of a donation to the
organization through which they were recruited. A
second $25 payment will go to the same group for
those participants who continue for the 3- to 4-year
life of the study. The rationale for this procedure is
that persons who might not participate in exchange
for a small cash payment to themselves could be
motivated to participate on behalf of an organization
to which they belong and whose goals they support.
A series of focus group discussions conducted with
citizens in three U.S. cities (Priest and Fussell 2006)
and eight depth interviews with scientiﬁc experts,
both completed in 2005, along with 33 earlier
interviews with undergraduate students (also in South
Carolina), guided the choice of risk and beneﬁt areas
to be included.
In order to gain additional perspective on how our
panelists might be similar to or different from other
groups, we also compare their baseline perceptions of
risk, beneﬁt, and need for regulation to those of a
group of 177 published nanoscience experts (includ-
ing scientists, engineers, and social science/humani-
ties scholars) that we had surveyed in a separate
email-based study a few months prior to the initiation
of this project (Besley et al. 2008).
We conducted the in-depth interviews with all 76
panelists in summer of 2007 (referred to as Time 1 or
T1 throughout this article), incorporating the quanti-
tative survey instruments that were designed to be
supplemented by later rounds of data collection. Our
ﬁrst follow-up was conducted in spring of 2008
(referred to here as Time 2 or T2), providing some
sense of the opinion trajectory, so far. Our study is
speciﬁcally concerned with the inﬂuence of media
messages, information-seeking, and interpersonal
discussion on opinion formation. While we explore
the issue of media use further below, our primary
goal is not to attempt direct measurement of the
‘‘effects’’ of media use. Instead, we sought to study
how citizens from diverse backgrounds actually come
to grips with newly emerging technologies, given
varied communication inﬂuences, but absent the
assumption that media would dominate them. Our
intent is to continue following these individuals for
an additional 2–3 years.
Five doctoral students from the University of
South Carolina College of Mass Communications and
Information Studies, who conducted the initial depth
interviews and simultaneously collected baseline
quantitative data, helped identify the groups to be
used. In order to maximize the likelihood of
14 J Nanopart Res (2010) 12:11–20
123recruitment success and good interviewer rapport,
each of the doctoral students interviewed members of
the groups with whom they had the closest personal
identiﬁcation (e.g., an African–American student
recruited and interviewed the African–American
church group members, a student interested in the
environment recruited and interviewed the Sierra
Club members, and so on).
All interviewers participated in an intensive one-
day training workshop at which materials were
distributed, appropriate interviewing techniques were
presented, and participants were given the opportu-
nity to practice their interviewing skills. While
variation in interviewer strengths and styles likely
persisted, the training assured some level of consis-
tency across interviews.
The interviews were carefully structured; they
began with completely open-ended questions about
what nanotechnology might be and what mental
images were associated with the term, then provided
participants with additional information based on the
NNI deﬁnition of nanotechnology, then proceeded
with a brief written survey to secure the baseline
quantitative data, and closed with additional open-
endedquestionstofurtherprobetheseinitialreactions.
All quantitative results are reported on 5-point scales.
All statistical comparisons were performed using
SPSS t-test routines; citizens at T1 versus scientists
were compared using two-tailed independent samples
tests, while T1 versus T2 citizen perceptions were
compared using two-tailed paired samples tests.
MANOVA analysis using all three independent and
all three dependent variables produced almost iden-
tical results, so for simplicity, we present the results
for each t-test separately.
Findings
Initial ﬁndings suggest that our participants began
with very little information about nanotechnology
(Priest and Kramer 2008). In most cases, they
nevertheless conveyed a surprisingly accurate general
idea of the term before receiving additional informa-
tion from the interviewers. For example, they gener-
ally understood that nanotechnology refers to very
small technology that might have applications in
electronics, computers, medicine, and other areas.
They also had a general ‘‘template’’ of expectations
for new technology that they applied to this novel
example, a template that (as stated above) assumes
technology brings both risks and beneﬁts. While
some participants had to be ‘‘drawn out’’ to offer their
perspective on this novel set of technologies for
which they often had only general knowledge of
technology to serve as context, most did not have
sustained difﬁculty in discussing nanotech once they
got started. (This was in contrast to our experiences
with the earlier student interviews, where our under-
graduate interviewees seemed much more reluctant to
offer an opinion.)
Figure 1a–c compares the perceived levels of risk,
beneﬁt, and need for regulation of panel members
with those of the surveyed experts. With respect to
beneﬁts (1a), the citizens’ panel members at T1 expect
slightly more beneﬁt in six of seven areas assessed (all
but new material development; n.s. except for natural
resource conservation at p = 0.02 and energy pro-
duction at p = 0.01). Citizen beneﬁt perceptions at T2
follow the same pattern; see below. This is consistent
with an understanding of U.S. culture as generally
pro-technology and of nanotechnology as largely
lacking the problematic ethical associations of bio-
technology (Priest and Fussell 2006). The striking
thing is, indeed, how closely our panelists—including
both environmentalists and religious conservatives—
resembled nanotechnology experts in general expec-
tations for nano-technology beneﬁts, and how little
these beneﬁt perceptions changed over time.
Risks present a slightly different picture (1b),
however, with panelists at T1 seeing more risk than
scientists for six out of the eight areas (four
signiﬁcant at p B 0.04 and two n.s.) and less risk
than scientists only for human health and environ-
mental pollution (both n.s.). Risk perceptions for
panelists at T2 increased noticeably, as will also be
discussed further below. The perceived need for
regulation (1c), however, most sharply divides the T1
citizen panel members from the expert respondents
across six different areas assessed (p B 0.001 in each
case), a pattern that continues at T2.
Visual inspection easily conﬁrms that for the non-
expert respondents, perceptions of societalrisks are on
the rise, as are those for health risks, while beneﬁt
expectations and most opinions about regulation
remain stable. Panel members’ perceptions of risk
increasedfromT1toT2acrossalleightitems,aperiod
of only approximately 9 months, with the largest
J Nanopart Res (2010) 12:11–20 15
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expenses, human health, a ‘‘rich/poor divide,’’ and
then environmental pollution. However, only the T1–
T2 increase in privacy issues risk is statistically
signiﬁcant, given our small N (at p = 0.002). The
change in perceived need for regulation on privacy
grounds is marginally signiﬁcant at p = 0.06.
Media use patterns among our panelists, while
intriguing, so far show very little consistent relation-
ship to perceptions of nanotechnology-related risk,
which would make sense based on the low level of
risk reporting seen in the news media. We were
unable to speciﬁcally attribute the heightened risk
perceptions we observed to exposure to speciﬁc
media and information. This comparison was con-
founded, however, by the fact that different groups of
respondents began with different levels of perceived
risk at T1. Reading a national paper is associated with
less of an increase in perceived environmental risk
from T1 to T2 (r =- 0.349, p B 0.01), but it is likely
Fig. 1 Mean panelist and scientist perceptions. a Panel
responses to the question ‘‘How beneﬁcial do you believe
nanotechnology will be for society over the next 20 years in
each of the following areas,’’ and scientist responses to the
question ‘‘How important do you believe nanotechnology’s
beneﬁts will be for society over the next 20 years in each of the
following areas.’’ b Panel responses to the question ‘‘How risky
do you believe nanotechnology will be for society over the
20 years with respect to each of the following areas,’’ and
scientist responses to the question ‘‘How important do you
believe nanotechnology’s risks will be for society over the next
20 years in each of the following areas.’’ c Panel responses to
the question ‘‘How important do you believe it is to have
regulations to control nanotechnology’s risk in each of the
following areas,’’ and scientist response to the question ‘‘How
important do you believe it is to have regulations to control
nanotechnology’s risks in each of the following areas.’’
Standard deviations for beneﬁts ranged from 0.785 to 1.155;
for risks from 1.009 to 1.300; and for regulation from 0.950 to
1.399 across all groups
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began with more environmental risk awareness, and
therefore exhibited less change. Conversely, listening
to talk radio is associated with more increase in
perceived human health risk (r = 0.351, p B 0.01),
but this may be because frequent talk radio listeners
were initially less aware of these risks, and not
because talk radio necessarily discussed them.
However, by dividing the panelists into low- and
high-media exposure groups based on T1 data
(Table 1), it becomes clear that overall, higher media
exposure is consistently associated with elevated risk
perceptions, and also that almost all risk perceptions
among both the low-media exposure and the high-
media exposure group are rising over time. The index
of media exposure used here was simply the sum of
the weekly frequency of exposure our participants
reported at T1 over eight different media: national
news magazines, national newspapers, regional news-
papers, local newspapers, national television news,
local television news, talk radio, and Internet.
Participants falling at or below an index value of 23
(representing the 50th percentile out of a possible
total score of 56, 7 days 9 8 media) were considered
‘‘low exposure’’ and those at 24 or above were
considered ‘‘high exposure.’’
We caution against over-interpreting these results;
all media variables are indices of general informa-
tion-seeking activity and also reﬂect demographic
factors such as educational levels, lifestyle choices,
and a range of other factors, as well as any direct
message ‘‘effects.’’ Further, so little coverage appears
to be being given to risk in news reports of
nanotechnology that there would be little solid basis
for inferring a direct effect under any circumstances.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the high exposure
group begins at T1 with risk perceptions that are
often close to or higher than those of the low-
exposure group at T2, and at T2 an obvious ‘‘risk
gap’’ remains between the two groups.
Equally striking is the fact that for both the low-
exposure group and the high-exposure group, almost
all risk perceptions are increasing, but the patterns are
distinct. The low-exposure group had a statistically
signiﬁcant increase in risk perception for privacy
only, a comparison exhibiting the greatest absolute
Table 1 Comparison between low- and high-media exposures
respondents (those below vs. above the 50th percentile for all
panelists participating at T1; 8 separate media use indexes
combined; all risk perception data reported on 5-point scale
from 1 = ‘‘not important’’ to 5 = ‘‘very important’’ in
response to question: ‘‘How risky do you believe nanotech-
nology will be for society over the next 20 years with respect
to each of the following areas?’’)
Perceived 20-year risk (5-point scale) of nanotechnology for respondents characterized by:
Low-media exposure High-media exposure ‘‘Risk gap’’
In the area of T1 T2 T1 T2 T2
Human health 3.04 3.25 3.18 3.75
a ?0.50
Animal health 3.08 2.96 2.96 3.21 ?0.25
Environmental pollution 2.56 2.88 2.89 3.14 ?0.26
Expenses 2.92 3.20 2.96 3.57
b ?0.37
Rich/poor country divide 2.80 3.00 3.50 3.89 ?0.89
Privacy issues 2.88 3.68
c 3.39 3.93
d ?0.25
Access issues 2.76 2.92 3.39 3.32 ?0.40
Economic insecurity 2.36 2.72 2.93 2.82 ?0.10
The ‘‘risk gap’’ represents the degree to which high media exposure respondents continue to perceive more risk than low-media
exposure respondents at T2. Signiﬁcance levels of p = 0.100 or below based on 2-tailed t-tests between T1 and T2 values for
perceived risk by type of risk separately for each exposure group are indicated in footnotes a–d. Includes only respondents who
remained active in study at T2 (N = 57)
a p = 0.080
b p = 0.027
c p = 0.041
d p = 0.037
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had statistically signiﬁcant increases for expenses of
everyday life as well as privacy and a marginally
signiﬁcant increase in perceived risk in the area of
health. While we were unable to discern patterns
attributable to type of media consumed (e.g., national
newspapers versus Internet versus local TV news),
more active media consumers did exhibit heightened
risk perception over time in more categories, as well
as more absolute risk perceived.
We also assume that audiences form interpretive
communities that bring quite different social values
and cultural understandings to bear on interpreting
the same message (Priest 2008). The differences in
media consumption, we observe here also reﬂect
lifestyle differences; the regular national newspaper
reader likely has a different background and news
coverage expectation from the regular local newspa-
per reader, for example. However, media is not the
only inﬂuence on opinion formation. A long tradition
in communication research, beginning with voting
studies by Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) and Katz and
Lazarsfeld (1955), suggests that interpersonal com-
munication is often more inﬂuential than mass media
communication in changing attitudes. A more recent
and increasingly well-developed trend is to look at
the impacts of information-seeking behavior. We
investigated both of these inﬂuences for our panel.
The impact of information-seeking is a signiﬁcant
(p B 0.05) or marginally signiﬁcant (p B 0.10) pre-
dictor of change for four out of eight of the risk
perceptions studied. Whether statistically signiﬁcant
or not, information-seeking is associated with an
increase in perceived risk in all but one case, that
of privacy, which was marginally signiﬁcant
(p = 0.059), but in the opposite direction—i.e., more
active information-seekers were not more likely to
have rising perceptions of privacy risk from T1 to T2
and may be so less. For human health risk, seeking is a
signiﬁcant predictor of a rise in increased risk percep-
tion at p = 0.031; for a rich/poor country divide, the
equivalent ﬁgure is p = 0.007 (Table 2).
The ‘‘picture’’ for an included discussion variable
at T2 is clear to a lesser extend. Respondents at T2
were asked whether they recalled discussing nano-
technology with anyone since T1; just over half
(55%) said no. Those who reported discussing
nanotechnology with others between T1 and T2
perceive higher risk in the areas of human health,
animal health, environmental pollution, expenses,
and economic uncertainty, and less risk in the areas of
privacy and access. However, none of these relation-
ships is statistically signiﬁcant, based on comparison
of those who recall having discussions versus those
who do not (Table 3). We look forward to the
opportunity to look at this relationship again once
further longitudinal data have been obtained.
Discussion
What is the ‘‘correct’’ level of risk that should be seen
here? We are more interested in understanding the
nature of people’s perceptions than in evaluating
them against a hypothetical scale of accuracy. We do
not claim that elevated risk perceptions represent a
distortion nor do we claim that they do not. Policy
makers interested in responding appropriately to
public concerns might note, nevertheless, the more
rapid rise in what we have termed ‘‘societal risks’’ in
comparison to those associated with health and
environment. While evidence continues to accumu-
late that health and environmental effects need
attention, ordinary citizens also have additional
concerns. At this point, in our panel study, these
concerns are highest for erosion of privacy, with the
Table 2 Changes in risk perception for eight nanotechnology-related risk areas as a function of information-seeking behavior among
South Carolina citizens’ panel members (only signiﬁcance levels at or below 0.100 are shown)
Unit change (on 5-point scale) for perceived risk of nanotechnology for:
Human
health
Animal
health
Environment Impact on
expenses
Rich/poor
divide
Privacy
issues
Access
issues
Economic
disruption
‘‘Seeker’’ mean perceived risk increase ?1.13 ?0.80 ?0.60 ?0.60 ?1.13 0.00 ?0.07 ?0.13
‘‘Non-seeker’’ mean perceived risk increase ?0.09 -0.18 ?0.09 ?0.26 ?0.06 ?0.91 ?0.03 ?0.09
Signiﬁcance of two-tailed t-test
for equality of means
0.031 0.068 n.s. n.s. 0.007 0.059 n.s. n.s.
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country divide about tied for second place. This is the
case despite a relative dearth of news coverage of
nanotechnology and its risks (Friedman and Egolf
2008).
While the patterns we observed may reﬂect
general ambient concerns about social trends, as
well as general expectations for technology that are
not speciﬁcally limited to nanotechnology, we
consider them important evidence that societal
considerations matter. When we discuss risks and
associated ethical considerations within the expert
community, we most commonly think in terms of
physical hazards—dimensions that threat human
health or environmental integrity. Our regulatory
system is beginning to respond to these risks for
nanotechnology, despite great challenges and uncer-
tainties. However, we do very little to address other
perceived societal concerns, such as erosion of
privacy or economic impacts. Public discussion of
nanotechnology (and, for that matter, all technology)
should expand to consider broader social impacts by
using an ‘‘expanded vocabulary of risk’’ that helps
legitimize these concerns. Whether or not support-
able by evidence or borne out by future events, all
such public concerns will contribute (directly or
indirectly) to the acceptability or unacceptability of
future technology.
It remains difﬁcult, even after reviewing the
interview material, to fully grasp why a large
proportion of Americans associated privacy erosion
with nanotechnology; it may have to do either with
miniaturization in electronics or with the capacity of
those electronics to store increasing amounts of
medical and ﬁnancial information, or it may represent
a background concern with little logical connection to
this speciﬁc class of technologies. The concern with
economic disparity is in some ways equally puzzling;
in retrospect, we have to wonder what our respon-
dents understood by a ‘‘rich/poor country divide.’’
Yet, in a crumbling economy, heightened awareness
of the potential economic dimensions of any tech-
nology (for better or for worse) is hardly surprising.
The technology planning process in the U.S. (as
elsewhere) clearly does not do enough to understand,
let alone address, the association of these broad
societal issues with technological change.
We recognize that these results may have been
inﬂuenced by respondent sensitization (i.e., that these
respondents may have reacted to any nanotechnology
information they came across differently by virtue of
their participation in the study), and that the study is
also based on a non-random sample; therefore, its
elements are not necessarily generalizable to any
population. Nevertheless, we believe that the study
accurately captures important patterns in the initial
way non-expert groups respond to information con-
cerning nanotechnology and possibly other newly
emerging technologies.
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